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Policy  paper
1. This policy paper aims to contribute practical
insights and recommendations to the intense
debate on engagement of stakeholders in the
European Union’s trade policy. The EU is currently
facing increasing demand for a constructive
dialogue with stakeholders on trade. In response,
several new measures are being implemented or
planned at the moment. These ‘policy windows’
allow for certain short-term as well as longer-
term policy adjustments.
2. A well-functioning multistakeholder arrangement
involves representation of diverse opinions,
balanced participation, accountability of the
stakeholders and the multistakeholder body
towards each other and to the wider public,
as well as enabling stakeholders to make
meaningful contributions in the consultations.
It should lead to improved cooperation and
understanding among stakeholders, as well as
practical contribution to policies. Currently, the
EU has difficulties in all these aspects.
3. While some of the EU’s multistakeholder
mechanisms have good potential, overall, the
EU’s current system for consultation is disjointed
and weak. The EU does not offer a similar
level of engagement at all stages of decision-
making, to all stakeholders, on all topics in all
trade deals, impairing continuity and quality of
consultations. Existing dialogue mechanisms
often fail to produce specific outputs, or their
recommendations are not taken into account.
The EU should adopt a holistic approach,
identifying and filling the gaps in the overall
consultation system.
4.  The EU does not have a clearly defined range of
stakeholders to be consulted on trade; the circle
varies from case to case. Consistent and inclusive
use of the concept of multistakeholderism is
recommended.
5. The main systemic challenges that the EU faces
in its dialogue with stakeholders on trade include:
a) lack of information about the impact of the
Issue 2018/01 • October 2018




 1  The author is most grateful to Jan Orbie, Jamal Shahin, Lotte Drieghe, Austin Ruckstuhl, Niels Gheyle and Beatriz Porres for their 
invaluable comments and suggestions. This paper has been developed in the framework of the project GREMLIN: Global and REgional
MuLtistakeholder Institutions on the contribution of global and regional multistakeholder mechanisms in improving global governance. 
Responsibility for the content, including all omissions and errors, lies solely with the author.
Policy  paper • n° 2018/01
2
EU’s trade deals; b) not adequately involving 
all partners at all stages in the consultation 
process; c) in certain cases, excessive 
fragmentation of consultation mechanisms in 
the framework of a single agreement; d) low 
impact of stakeholders’ recommendations 
and weak accountability; e) uneven patterns 
of stakeholder engagement; f) misperceptions 
and lack of communication existing between 
governmental and non-governmental 
stakeholders from the EU and partner countries; 
and g) excessive pro-business bias.
6. The main procedural challenges include: 
a) lack of resources and inequality among 
stakeholders; b) limited organizational support 
available to multistakeholder mechanisms; 
c) insufficient transparency and publicity of 
consultation mechanisms; d) non-transparent 
stakeholder selection; and e) insufficient 
engagement with national level stakeholders. 
7. The main recommendations for improving 
systemic conditions for dialogue include a) 
harmonizing the definition of ‘stakeholder’ 
and aiming for universal multistakeholder 
approach; b) ‘filling the gaps’ in the overall 
consultation system; c) implementing the 
principle of “one agreement, one civil society 
body”; d) strengthening EU institutions’ own 
capacity for engagement with stakeholders; 
e) more assertive enforcement and stronger 
follow-up to multistakeholder bodies’ decisions; 
f) reconsidering the adversarial, ‘civil society vs. 
government’ approach, particularly in relations 
with the partner countries; g) promoting 
horizontal ties among stakeholders; as well as 
h) building mutual awareness and promoting 
differential approach to partner countries.
8. The main recommendations for improving 
procedural aspects of multistakeholderism 
include: a) changing the principles of 
stakeholder support; b) changing incentives 
for stakeholders to participate in consultation 
mechanisms; c) enhancing publicity and 
providing ‘one stop shop’ information on 
participation opportunities; d) engaging 
stakeholders proactively and e) more efficiently; 
and f) strengthening engagement with 
stakeholders on the national level. It is crucial 
to align the consultations in the field of trade 
with general standards set in, among others, 
2017 Better Regulation Toolbox.
 Over the last two years the public debate around trade policy 
has intensified – and not just in Europe. [..] Policy makers in democratic systems 
have to listen to that debate, understand it and respond to it. [..] I see this debate as an 
opportunity to look hard at some of our approaches and update them where needed. 
– Cecilia Malmström, “TTIP and Beyond: EU Trade Policy in the 21st Century,”  
New York, 25 September 2015
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This policy paper aims to contribute to 
the intense debate on engagement of 
stakeholders in the European Union’s trade 
policy by providing practical insights and 
recommendations. Participation of diverse 
stakeholders in trade policy-making has 
become a highly topical issue, with European 
Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker 
promising to increase openness of trade policy 
and new approaches being discussed and 
planned at this very moment. Among the recent 
developments are the new Group of Experts on 
EU Trade Agreements and a new 15-point plan 
(non-paper) of the Commission services on 
improving the implementation and enforcement 
of Trade and Sustainable Development chapters 
in trade agreements which includes multiple 
points on transparency and engagement with 
stakeholders.1  Stakeholder engagement will 
become all the more important, as the scope of 
the EU’s trade agreements with third countries 
keeps expanding, new agreements are 
concluded, and new principles such as gender 
equality are included therein. In light of these 
new initiatives, it is a good moment to evaluate 
current practices and discuss possible short-
term as well as longer-term policy adjustments. 
The EU’s current system for engaging 
stakeholders specifically in the field of 
trade is disjointed, even though some EU’s 
multistakeholder mechanisms are well-
established and the EU has laid down 
advanced guidelines on consultations.2 There 
are numerous formal and informal points 
of access to the system. None of the formal 
options offers a direct and reliable opportunity 
for stakeholders’ views to be channelled into 
policies. The very multitude of options, channels 
and venues to attend is confusing and taxing on 
stakeholders who wish to make use of them, and 
opinions voiced at one consultation platform 
or one policy-making stage often have to be 
repeated in other platforms or at other stages. 
The system is also weak on several accounts. In 
some cases, certain stakeholders are excluded 
or preferred over others for no apparent reason. 
Consultations often take place for the sake of 
consulting, without a clear finalité. While the 
Commission itself recognizes that stakeholders’ 
input can improve quality of decisions, the 
outcomes of these consultations are not 
necessarily converted into policies, and there 
is lack of accountability. The challenge, thus, 
is not only to improve individual consultation 
mechanisms but also to streamline the overall 
system.
This paper focuses on the formal mechanisms 
operating in the framework of the EU’s trade 
policy, including Civil Society Dialogue (CSD); 
Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs) and Joint 
Civil Society Dialogue Fora (JCSDF) (and 
equivalent bodies) established by trade 
agreements; and diverse consultative groups. 
In addition, the role of informal participation of 
private businesses and other stakeholders is 
highlighted where feasible. Since the European 
Commission’s Directorate-General for Trade (DG 
TRADE) is the main body responsible for trade 
policy and, as such, the main counterpart for 
various stakeholders, most conclusions apply 
specifically to this DG. See also Table 1. 
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1. What is multistakeholderism and why 
is it important?
While there is no single generally accepted 
definition of multistakeholderism either in the EU 
practice or in academic literature, we can broadly 
define it as “policy processes which allow for the 
participation of the primary affected stakeholders, 
or groups of these who represent different 
interests.”3  Criteria for a ‘good’ multistakeholder 
arrangement are given in p. 2. Multistakeholderism 
is an advanced form of participatory democracy. As 
such, it cannot replace representative democracy, 
but is generally accepted as a solution, if not the 
solution, to the infamous ‘democracy deficit.’ 
Multistakeholderism has become a norm in 
conduct of international trade – not only in 
the EU but also on the global level. However, 
this norm is not yet universal, nor does it mean 
complete equality of various stakeholders 
in practice. The EU does not offer similar 
possibilities of contribution to policy-making 
process at all stages of decision-making, to 
all stakeholders, on all topics in all trade deals 
(please see table 2 in p. 3.b.). Engagement in 
its current shape is more frequently information 
relay from the institutions to stakeholders, 
rather than a real possibility for interest 
representatives to shape policies. Moreover, 
while some stakeholders do maintain dialogue 
with EU institutions, others feel disappointed 
with the results and resort to protests. Albeit 
complete equality of non-governmental 
stakeholders and EU institutions is neither 
feasible nor necessary, there is space for the EU 
to improve the level and quality of engagement 
with various groups. 
The EU itself has already recognized the 
importance of opening its trade policy up for 
Mechanism Description
Domestic Advisory Groups (DAGs)
Introduced under ‘new generation’ agreements to monitor implementation 
of Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters. Exist on both EU and 
partners’ side
Civil Society Dialogue (CSD)
European Commission’s oldest and most universal mechanism for engagement 
with civil society: created in 1999, same year as DG TRADE. 494 registered 
organizations as of September 2018. Ad hoc meetings as reaction to major 
developments
Online public consultations Organized through “Your Europe” online portal. Open to all interested parties
Group of Experts on EU Trade 
Agreements
Established in 2018, envisaged as a high-level initiative for liaison with major 
EU-level organizations and networks. 28 members + 1 observer, meets every 2 
months
Other consultative committees, 
expert groups, business contact 
groups
Convened by the Commission; both formal and informal
Bilateral meetings Informal, take place throughout policy-making cycle
Source: author’s compilation
Table 1. DG TRADE’s mechanisms for dialogue with stakeholders discussed in the paper
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discussion with stakeholders. If done well, there 
are two main benefits: improved quality of the 
policies and improved legitimacy. Quality-wise, 
the groups directly engaged in trade activities or 
influenced by them can offer invaluable insights. 
Legitimacy-wise, dramatic politicization of the EU’s 
trade policy means that citizens are increasingly 
aware of trade’s impact on them as well as the 
outside world and demand changes. In order to 
harness stakeholders’ expertise and alleviate their 
concerns, existing consultation mechanisms must 
be made more inclusive, efficient, accountable and 
public. 
We should also clarify the link between terms 
‘multistakeholderism’ and ‘civil society.’ Both, 
in essence, are vague. Understanding of ‘civil 
society’ in the EU is normally limited to non-profit 
associations with a legal personality. In contrast, 
‘multistakeholderism’ is a broader term. 2017 
Better Regulation Toolbox defines the following 
stakeholder categories: citizens, businesses, trade, 
business and professional associations, non-
governmental organisations, consultancy, research 
and academia, organisations representing regional, 
local and municipal authorities, other public or 
mixed sub-national entities, as well as national 
and international public authorities. This list is not 
exhaustive; indeed, we can add social movements 
without a legal personality, third country 
governments, as well as EU member states and 
EU institutions themselves. 
‘Multistakeholderism’ is the term preferred in 
this paper: while the EU often prefers to focus on 
‘civil society,’ it does not fully reflect the realities 
of EU governance, which is open, and should be 
open, not only to associations, but also to other 
types of stakeholders. While in practice some 
dialogue mechanisms are currently open to civil 
society only, they should also be understood 
as (imperfect) multistakeholder arrangements. 
In future, use of ‘multistakeholderism’ is 
recommended as a more accurate and potentially 
more attractive term to all sides involved. 
2. What is a ‘good’ arrangement for 
consulting multiple stakeholders? 
The following criteria for a meaningful stakeholder 
arrangement, developed by Jeremy Malcolm, offer 
a good start: 
1) Engaging the ‘right’ stakeholders, meaning 
that the views of all groups with a significant 
interest in a policy are represented. The 
stakeholders should be ready and willing to 
engage in the deliberation.
2) Balanced participation of stakeholders. The 
balance has to be found individually in each 
case; the purpose is to ensure that a single 
stakeholder does not dominate the debate, 
particularly if others have, for instance, more 
legitimacy or greater vested interest in an 
issue. 
3) Accountability of the multistakeholder body 
and individual stakeholders to each other. 
It means that the multistakeholder body is 
legitimate in the eyes of stakeholders and 
honest in balancing all sides’ interests; 
in turn, stakeholders can demonstrate 
that they can legitimately contribute their 
views (for instance, because they represent 
broad constituencies or possess relevant 
expertise).4 
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We can also identify two additional points: 
4) Political, institutional and legal environment 
which enables stakeholders to develop 
positions on policy issues, take part in 
consultations and have impact on policies. 
This presupposes, among other things, 
opportunities for continuous engagement, 
availability of financial and technical resources, 
clear information, logistical support and 
professional moderation of the meetings, 
access to the media, and accountability of 
governmental institutions to multistakeholder 
input. 
5) Accountability of multistakeholder fora to 
the wider public. This means that complete 
information on the operation of these fora is 
available to the wider public and the processes 
of recruiting their members, discussions 
themselves and incorporation of the outcomes 
into policies are transparent. Engagement with 
the media is a necessary condition. 
The EU faces certain issues with all five 
points, as will be seen from the rest of this 
paper. In addition, a key pitfall is the absence 
of a clearly defined and universally respected 
objective for multistakeholder mechanisms, 
which also complicates development of 
benchmarks by which these mechanisms can 
be evaluated.5 
We can distinguish two possible outcomes 
/ contributions of multistakeholder bodies 
that are, in principle, possible (alone or 
simultaneously). Ideally, both should go hand-
in-hand. These are: 
1) ‘tangible’ contribution of stakeholders to 
development, adoption and implementation 
of policies which means that multistakeholder 
forum comes to certain conclusions that are 
brought to the attention of policy-makers 
through vertical dialogue and, preferably, 
translated into policy (or rejected while still 
ensuring accountability). 
2) ‘intangible’ improvement of cooperation and 
understanding among stakeholders through 
horizontal dialogue. It may eventually enable 
them to find a consensus or compromise 
which can be communicated to policy-
makers; however, even if this is not the case, 
increased mutual awareness is a sign of 
improved policy environment. 
To sum up, we can evaluate a multistakeholder 
arrangement using both procedural criteria 
(five points outlined above) and performance-
based benchmarks (improved cooperation 
and understanding among stakeholders, as 
well as practical contribution to policies). 
The remainder of the paper will assess the 
mechanisms operating in the EU according 
to these standards, as well as current 
perspectives and further recommendations 
for their improvement. Both challenges and 
opportunities are subdivided into ‘systemic’ 
issues which have more fundamental impact 
but are also more resilient to change, and 
‘procedural’ issues that cannot, in themselves, 
solve all problems that multistakeholderism 
in the EU faces, but are somewhat more 
manageable.
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3. Systemic challenges
These are fundamental challenges affecting 
the functioning of the consultation process as 
a whole. Their resolution calls for political will 
and, in some cases, legal adjustments. 
3.a Lack of information about the 
impact of the EU’s trade deals
There is lack of legitimate and independently 
acknowledged information about the impact of 
EU’s trade policy. As 2014 report by the European 
Court of Auditors (ECA) showed, in practice 
mandatory impact assessments (different 
types) were carried out only in a limited number 
of cases and used unreliable methodology. The 
ECA concluded, “Policymakers, stakeholders 
and European taxpayers are therefore 
insufficiently informed of the main advantages 
and disadvantages of the different trade policy 
options and of whether the implemented policy 
delivered its intended results.”6  
Experts argue that the EU lacks clear 
“development criteria, indicators and 
measurement” to assess the developmental 
impact of its trade deals.7  Although the 
Commission maintains that “the sustainable 
development chapters (TSD chapters) of 
EU FTAs have, in broad terms, worked well,”8 
independent studies show that the situation 
on the ground has not improved or indeed, has 
deteriorated. Through improving assessment 
methodology, the Commission would be able 
to provide more credible arguments in favour 
of its policies.  
3.b Weak links in the consultation process 
throughout policy-making cycle
Consultations with stakeholders must continue 
throughout the policy-making cycle in order 
to ensure continuity. While a uniformly high 
level of engagement throughout the process 
would, of course, be taxing resource-wise 
and not necessarily feasible, policy failure is 
even more taxing. Gaps in consultations with 
stakeholders at certain stages in the policy 
process mean loss of contact which can be 
difficult to renew. As a result, if the end policy 
significantly differs from what stakeholders 
helped to design, we can expect problems in 
ratification and implementation. However, as 
table 2 demonstrates, gaps indeed exist. 
While there are procedural factors at play, it 
would also take significant political will and 
commitment to streamline the whole process. 
Several aspects can be highlighted here: 
‘Blind spots’ in consultations 
• Weak formal stakeholder engagement 
at the stages of negotiations, ex post 
assessment, as well as enforcement and 
dispute settlement. 
• Weak formal stakeholder engagement 
by such institutions as the Council, the 
Parliament, the European External Action 
Service and many individual Member States. 
• Weak or non-existing stakeholder 
engagement in the ‘first generation’ 
agreements2  and stand-alone investment 
agreements; relatively weak engagement 
under GSP/GSP+ schemes; lack of 
recomm. 5d, 6c, 6f
recomm. 5b, 5d
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coordination in engagement with other 
trade partners.
Lack of information and coordination
• Low and incomplete availability of 
information, especially with regard to 
the process of negotiations, functions of 
different multistakeholder mechanisms 
and their operation, informal institutions’ 
meetings with stakeholders, etc.
• Strong informal  engagement with 
stakeholders at various stages and by 
various institutions, where the issue is lack 
of transparency.
• Unclear division of responsibilities between 
DG TRADE and other Commission services, 
as well as between the Commission and 
other governmental bodies at the EU and 
national level.  
 2  The ‘first generation’ agreements were concluded by the EU prior to 2011 and did not include provisions on consultations with 
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3.c	Excessive	fragmentation	of
consultation mechanisms in the framework 
of a single agreement 
(some cases) 
There is a plethora of dialogue mechanisms 
with very similar titles which confuse observers 
and participants alike. To take an Association 
Agreement (AA) with Georgia, Moldova or Ukraine 
as an example, we have a Domestic Advisory 
Group on the EU side, a DAG on the partner 
country side, joint DAG-to-DAG meetings (which 
are not formally stipulated in the agreements), 
Joint Civil Society Dialogue Forum on Trade 
and Sustainable Development as well as Civil 
Society Platform which, in principle, deals with 
the agreement as a whole, but in practice 
frequently turns to sustainable development-
related issues. The EU’s civil society roadmap 
(2014-2017, new one still under development), 
while not particularly ambitious and clear on the 
issue of trade specifically, foresaw support to civil 
society’s engagement in dialogue on sustainable 
development and overall closer engagement in 
dialogue with the EU Delegation.9  To add to the 
confusion, an unrelated, EU-created civil society 
body – Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum 
also delegates representatives to bilateral Civil 
Society Platforms established under AAs. One 
can easily understand why a stakeholder from the 
EU or, for instance, Georgia, might feel uncertain 
about which advisory bodies to apply to and 
which ones to lobby.
Chart 1. Fragmentation of consultation mechanisms in the framework of a single agreement: the 
case	of	AAs	/	DCFTAs	with	Georgia,	Moldova	and	Ukraine	
Source:	author’s	drawing,	partially	based	on	the	scheme	from	“Trade	and	Sustainable	Development	Chapters	
in EU Trade Agreements,” TSD Experts Group Meeting Brussels, 6 July 2017 Unit D.1 – DG TRADE, http://ec.europa.
eu/transparency/regexpert/index.cfm?do=groupDetail.groupDetailDoc&id=33780&no=3
recomm. 5c
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3.d Low impact of stakeholders’ 
recommendations and weak 
accountability 
Stakeholders’ recommendations are not always 
translated into policies, and accountability 
of governments is weak. For instance, while 
DAGs are supposed to participate in overseeing 
implementation of TSD provisions, in practice 
they often do not have the possibility to state 
their case to the governmental bodies and 
are merely debriefed about discussions at 
the official level. Similarly, the DAGs cannot 
utilize the usual dispute settlement procedures 
foreseen in the agreements; even the 'light' 
version specific to the TSD chapters has 
never been triggered. Thus, the stakeholders 
are essentially rendered powerless. Within DG 
TRADE, there are no clear algorithms for using 
outputs of either the Civil Society Dialogue 
or online consultations.10 The process of 
transposing stakeholders’ recommendations 
into policies remains non-transparent and at 




Not all partner countries are equally popular 
among the EU’s stakeholders. For instance, 
while business is highly interested and well 
represented in the Domestic Advisory Group 
with Korea (12 out of 20 EU DAG members in 
2016-2018), this has not been the case with 
Georgia which only had five EU DAG members 
in 2016-2018, among them one representative 
of business. Similarly, while some negotiations, 
such as TTIP or to a lesser degree CETA, come 
under intense scrutiny with stakeholders 
aggressively competing among themselves, 
other deals such as the new EU-Japan 
agreement or the modernised EU-Mexico trade 
agreement largely pass ‘under the radar’ of 
public scrutiny even if institutions such as the 
EESC do initiate the debate. It would be better 
for both quality and legitimacy of EU’s policies 
if the current ‘wax and wane campaign’ mode 
was replaced by more consistent, frequent 
and comprehensive stakeholder engagement 
throughout agreements, but conditions for this 
must be in place. 
3.f Misperceptions and lack of 




In the field of trade, it is particularly important 
to engage with stakeholders from third 
countries on the basis of mutual respect and 
understanding. While the EU does recognize 
the importance of understanding the local 
context, several challenges are observable. 
First, the EU is insufficiently sensitive to the 
fact that partner countries often have different 
multistakeholder structures that operate by 
different principles. There is also a tendency 
to overestimate the independence and pro-
democratic orientation of civil society in 
recomm. 5b, 5d, 5e, 6c, 6e
recomm. 5a, 6b, 6c, 6d
recomm. 5f, 5g, 5h, 6c
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partner countries. Additionally, communication 
among different groups of stakeholders in 
partner countries, as well as between partners’ 
governmental bodies and stakeholders is 
often weak. Many governments are not, in fact, 
interested in having a TSD chapter and civil 
society monitoring mechanisms, and view them 
as a nuisance or imposition. Also, EU-initiated 
civil society mechanisms are often the first time 
when diverse interests from third countries, 
such as employers and labour, sit at the same 
table. 
Finally, there is also marked ‘teacher-student’ 
dynamic at play in EU’s relations with partner 
countries that inhibits mutual understanding 
and erodes mutual respect. Discussions in civil 
society mechanisms are almost exclusively 
dedicated to the partner countries’ adjustment 
to the EU standards, without raising the issue 
of how the EU could adjust its policies to 
better fit the partners’ needs. Realities in the 
partner countries are not always understood 
by EU stakeholders, and there is a certain lack 
of mutual respect and camaraderie between 
stakeholders from the EU and partner countries. 
3.g	Excessive	pro-business	bias	
Business representatives are the most 
traditional and accepted interlocutor in the 
sphere of trade; they are also better represented 
in and more satisfied with EU’s multistakeholder 
consultation mechanisms on trade policy. 
Although there should be no artificial ceilings 
on engagement with business, at the moment 
there is an excessive institutionalization of 
the EU-to-business relationship while other 
players sometimes are excluded from the 
talks. Some of the examples are the Market 
Access Advisory Committee and the Trade 
Policy Committee of the Council, where 
evidence shows they are open to business 
but not to other stakeholders.11  In addition, 
business is the most frequent participant in 
informal meetings with EU institutions. The 
quality and public image of EU’s engagement 
with stakeholders would benefit from greater 
inclusiveness while continuing to respect the 
business interests.
4. Procedural challenges 
These challenges to dialogue with stakeholders 
are easier to resolve than the systemic ones, 
although in several cases, adaptation would 
require not only putting new procedures in 
place but also investing resources in making 
them fully functional. 
recomm. 5a, 6d
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Mechanism for dialogue with 
stakeholders 
Comments 
Domestic Advisory Groups 
(DAGs)
DAG membership is expected to be balanced between economic, labour and environmental 
interests, which in practice is not the case. Environmental interests are underrepresented, 
while a significant proportion of organizations self-identify as ‘other.’ DAGs have no legal 
power to affect the implementation process. Partner countries tend not to take into 
account their recommendations; DAGs themselves are not particularly productive in 
issuing ones. There is "little evidence that vigorous monitoring has been conducted."12 
In many partner countries DAGs do not exist, are weak or lack independence. There are 
no legal provisions for joint DAG-to-DAG meetings, relations between EU and non-EU 
DAGs are weak
Civil Society Dialogue (CSD)
It is more technical than strategic, topics are often selected by the Commission. It is 
mainly debriefing by the Commission not two-way dialogue; often takes place after 
respective decisions have already been taken. Due to its debriefing nature, the CSD does 
not generate clear outputs for Commission’s work, nor is there a specific mechanism 
within the Commission to channel the outputs into policies. There is a possibility for the 
CSD members to prepare ‘position papers,’ but, since it is unclear whether and how these 
would be used, only a few organizations use this option. Observations show that only 
about 5 to 20% of registered organizations attend each meeting. The CSD is oriented at 
‘representative’ organizations; universities and academics cannot register in the CSD 
database. Meetings take place in English only, with no translation offered, and approx. 
50% of all organizations come from Brussels (2014). The Commission is not proactive 
in engaging stakeholders on specific topics13
Online public consultations
May gather excessive number of responses, thus being very taxing to analyse 
(especially open-ended questions) or may not gather a sufficient number of responses 
to be representative.14  It can be difficult to obtain balanced input from various groups. 
The system may be intentionally abused. Sometimes too difficult for target groups to 
understand terminology-wise. Summaries of results and follow-up measures are not 
always published
Group of Experts on EU Trade 
Agreements
Paradoxically very limited in membership and consists of EU-level organizations but is 
ambitiously tasked with advising on “perception and public debate” on trade agreements 
and in particular with providing insight into national-level debate. Overall very broad and 
somewhat unclear mandate. Some stakeholders argue the number of participants is still 
too large to get their message across
Other consultative committees, 
expert groups, business contact 
groups
Non-transparent. Sometimes engage with non-governmental stakeholders but the criteria 
are not clear, nor are the steps that must be taken to be invited to a meeting
Bilateral meetings Non-transparent. Approx. 70% of the meetings take place with business representatives.
15 
Only data about meetings with Commissioners and most senior civil servants is public
Table 3. DG TRADE’s mechanisms for dialogue with stakeholders – main procedural challenges by 
mechanism  
Source: author’s compilation 
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4.a Lack of resources and inequality among 
stakeholders
Lack of resources and inequality among 
stakeholders are some of the key problems 
stakeholders are facing right now. Financial 
resources are essential to: 
• Enable professional representatives to 
analyse EU’s policies and engage with EU’s 
representatives (all the more important 
since EU institutions often prefer to receive 
proposals of high legal and technical quality 
which fit the overall EU acquis),
• Enable organizations to meaningfully 
engage with their members and dedicate 
time to accumulating opinions and seeking 
compromises.
In practice, EU and partner countries’ 
stakeholders, especially non-economic 
interests, are struggling to find resources to 
fulfil these two functions – a problem that 
will become all the more important as the 
involvement of stakeholders is expanding. For 
example, the Commission is concluding new 
trade agreements, expanding the mandates 
of the DAGs to monitoring implementation of 
entire agreements not just TSD chapters, and 
including new principles in future agreements 
such as gender equality. The need to provide 
funding for research and analysis has often 
been raised.16
Disparity in access to resources leads to 
underrepresentation of certain (groups of) 
stakeholders. Stakeholders from the ‘new,’ 
‘small’ and less prosperous EU member states, 
as well as many partner states’ representatives, 
are less active in lobbying and less likely to be 
heard. Out of 494 organisations included in 
the DG TRADE’s civil society database (which 
gives rights to participate in the Civil Society 
Dialogue and Domestic Advisory Groups), 
only 10, or 2%, are registered in the countries 
that have joined the EU in or after 2004. Out 
of these 13 countries, 8 are not represented 
by any organisation. In addition, the EU’s 
partners and their stakeholders have widely 
unequal resources to defend their interests. 
Third country governments seldom support 
their representatives to attend stakeholder 
consultation mechanisms such as DAGs, 
which has resulted in partners being severely 
underrepresented in meetings held in the EU 
or elsewhere in their own regions. New hopes 
are set on the project worth EUR 3 million and 
funded by the EU’s Partnership Instrument 
which aims to support the functioning of civil 
society mechanisms and was supposed to start 
in spring 2018 (later postponed). However, it 
is important to support not only the (few) 
participants of formal civil society mechanisms 
but also other third country representatives 
who wish to take part in the debate. 
4.b	Limited	organizational	support	available	
to	civil	society	mechanisms	
Currently, existing mechanisms can dedicate 
only a limited time and organizational 
capacity to debate. DAG meetings on the EU 
recomm. 6a, 6d, 6f
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side normally take place three times a year 
for several hours. Joint Civil Society Dialogue 
Forum normally takes place once a year and 
the Civil Society Platform meets twice a year, 
both last for one day. Since the actual time 
of meetings is so short, statements adopted 
at the end tend to include points which were 
not raised or were discussed only partially 
during the day. Stakeholders cannot take 
advantage of dedicated field trips and informal 
networking opportunities. While the EESC 
provides secretarial services to the EU DAGs 
and joint meetings, partner countries normally 
do not have secretariats for their DAGs, which 
diminishes their efficiency, hampers information 
exchange and obstructs communication 
between EU and non-EU stakeholders. 
4.c	Insufficient	transparency	and	publicity	
of consultation mechanisms
Nominally, the EU has reached quite a high 
level of transparency in its trade policy: 
for instance, the Commission has recently 
promised to publish all negotiating mandates, 
to extend stakeholders’ oversight role to 
entire trade agreements not merely TSD 
chapters, and to upgrade ‘first generation’ 
free trade agreements by including provisions 
on openness and dialogue with civil society. 
However, transparency of the Council’s 
operation and of various Commission’s expert 
groups and bilateral meetings can and should 
be improved. The recently started negotiations 
on a mandatory Transparency Register for the 
Council, the Commission and the Parliament 
are very important and potentially promising in 
this regard.
In addition, the EU’s efforts for engaging 
stakeholders are not getting sufficient public 
attention. For instance, Civil Society Dialogue 
meetings at the Commission have been closed 
to the press; the main modes for communication 
about the meetings are press releases, social 
media and information on DG TRADE’s website, 
which are controlled by the Commission and 
do not offer full insight into the intricacies of 
the debate. Similarly, the meetings of Domestic 
Advisory Groups, Civil Society Fora etc. are 
closed to the media and are not accompanied 
by dedicated engagement opportunities such as 
press conferences. This situation is paradoxical 
– mechanisms dedicated to transparency and 
communication with society are well shielded 
from public scrutiny. 
4.d Non-transparent stakeholder selection 
There are two possible criteria of selecting 
partners for dialogue: 
1) focusing on ‘representative’ large civil 
society organizations, preferably pan-European 
networks, which are supposed to be the 
aggregate voice of large constituencies (narrow 
understanding of representativeness);
2) selection on the basis of diversity and 
content (added value) of views that can be 
brought in by the stakeholders, regardless of 
their size and scope. 
recomm. 5c, 6c, 6d
recomm. 6b, 6c
Policy  paper • n° 2018/01
16
Currently, the EU in general and DG TRADE 
in particular often gravitate towards the first 
approach. Key formal dialogue mechanisms, 
including the Civil Society Dialogue, the 
Domestic Advisory Groups and the new Group 
of Experts on EU Trade Agreements, are closed 
to individual businesses  and academics, 
universities and certain other players. 
The Group of Experts, in particular, only 
includes “European-level, non-governmental 
organisations.”17 
Instead, we should evaluate representativeness 
of the system of consultations using alternative 
criteria – organizations’ ability to voice main 
ideas on the public good which exist in the 
society, to effectively present the real people’s 
experiences and to improve the quality of 
policies (where academics in particular can 
provide a valuable contribution).18 The EU 
should pay more attention to diversity and 
content of views represented in the dialogue 
regardless of the specific form of stakeholder 
who voices them.  
Finally, the selection of stakeholders is 
insufficiently transparent on the side of both the 
EU and partner countries. For instance, the ‘Call 
for Expressions of Interest in participation in 
EU Domestic Advisory Groups’ issued in March 
2018 was not publicized on DG TRADE’s social 
media, nor was it advertised in a prominent 
place on its website. Under such conditions it is 
no surprise that the Commission encountered 
difficulties in recruiting a sufficient number of 
candidates for some of the DAGs. Moreover, 
the decision on whom to select is taken by the 
Commission. On the partner side, governments 
frequently dictate which organizations are 
recruited to the civil society mechanisms. 
4.e	 Insufficient	engagement	with	national	
level	stakeholders	
Strengthening engagement with stakeholders 
on the national level is becoming increasingly 
important, as extreme politicization of trade 
deals in the last years has taken the debate to 
the member states. However, while the EU has 
recognized this imperative (in the ‘Trade for All’ 
communication in particular)19,  it has not yet 
followed up with adequate measures. 
5.Recommendations for 





The notion of stakeholders is used rather 
inconsistently across EU documents, evidently 
due to underlying lack of clarity about who 
should be engaged, when and how. It would 
benefit the EU’s functioning and public image 
to consistently use a broad definition of 
‘stakeholder’ (as in the 2017 Better Regulation 
Toolbox) in order to secure the place of various 
interests around the table. It is also unfortunate 
that at the moment, the term and practical 
approach of ‘multistakeholderism’ is only used 
incidentally and at a very low level, such as 
recomm. 6c, 6f
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the Technical Committee for the EU Fair and 
Ethical City Award. The use of this concept, in 




As detailed in the point 3.2., the EU’s engagement 
with stakeholders is not uniform throughout the 
process: there are major gaps at some policy-
making stages, in some institutions and in 
relations with some third countries. Streamlining 
the consultation process and ‘filling the gaps’ 
is a very ambitious recommendation that 
would require a major effort and, ideally, close 
cooperation among various institutions engaged 
in trade policy. Some of the measures to be taken 
include: 
• strengthening EU institutions’ formal 
engagement with stakeholders and making 
informal engagement more transparent; 
• as currently planned, upgrading ‘first 
generation’ agreements to include stronger 
clauses on stakeholder participation (and 
by all means preserving already existing 
provisions on dialogue); 
• enhancing dialogue with third country 
stakeholders, especially in countries not party 
to ‘first generation’ agreements. This can be 
achieved in particular by updating civil society 
roadmaps to foresee a structured dialogue on 
trade issues; 
• improving consultation opportunities on other 
trade policy issues such as trade disputes and 
trade sanctions against third countries;
• creating and strengthening mechanisms for 
dialogue after the proposal stage; 
• creating channels for exchange of 
stakeholders’ input between institutions; 
• promoting horizontal stakeholder-to-
stakeholder dialogue. 
5.c	 “One	 agreement,	 one	 civil	 society	
body”
This principle has been put forward by the 
European Economic and Social Committee, 
which suggests that “both follow-up and 
monitoring of signed agreements are combined 
into a single – institutionalised and adequately 
funded – structure.”20  “One agreement, one civil 
society body” would be a good response to the 
current extreme fragmentation of consultation 
mechanisms as detailed in the p. 3.c. In addition, 
newly created dialogue mechanisms at the EU 
level (such as the new Group of Experts on 
EU Trade Agreements) could be positioned as 
subgroups of the Civil Society Dialogue (and 
report to it), instead of standing separately. 
5.d Strengthening EU institutions’ own 
capacity for engagement with stakeholders
The Commission and other EU bodies already 
face resource shortage affecting their ability 
to engage with stakeholders and source 
outside expertise. If existing gaps in the 
overall process of dialogue with stakeholders 
are filled, even more human and financial 
resources will be necessary. For this reason, 
issues 3b, 3d
issues 3c, 4c
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it is crucial to strengthen the EU institutions’ 
own capacity to engage with stakeholders, 
in particular by delegating more officers to 
manage the dialogue, summarize outputs and 
ensure that these are taken on board within 
the EU policy-making system. This capacity 
strengthening should also include, in particular, 
conducting public opinion surveys. The last 
special Eurobarometer survey dedicated to 
international trade was carried out in 2010; 
however, comprehensive surveys provide a 
wealth of statistically representative data 
that complements the information offered by 
stakeholders. 
5.e	 More	 assertive	 enforcement	 and	
stronger follow-up 
In their 2018 Non paper, the Commission 
services promised ‘more assertive enforcement’ 
of the TSD chapters, ‘enabling’ civil society 
mechanisms to perform monitoring functions 
and making better use of the dispute settlement 
mechanisms. Since civil society mechanisms 
under TSD chapters are currently lacking 
credibility, these promises must be delivered 
upon. 
It is also essential to ensure accountability: 
making sure that stakeholders’ views are 
conveyed to policy-makers and reporting back 
to multistakeholder mechanisms on how their 
recommendations have been implemented in 
practice or why the EU and partner governments 
have decided not to implement them. The 
EU needs clear algorithms through which 
stakeholders’ recommendations feed into the 
policy-making process and publicly available 
information on which suggestions have been 
adopted or rejected and why. Absence of a 
reverse link may lead to ‘consultation fatigue,’ 
when stakeholders withdraw from dialogue 
because they do not see added value in it. 
Finally, it is possible to improve the 
quality of follow-up by linking decisions of 
multistakeholder bodies to the EU’s financial 
programming. Currently, even advisory bodies 
overseeing implementation of agreements do 
not discuss how the EU’s financial assistance 
for implementation is spent. It should be 
possible, however, to hold such a discussion 
and take these bodies’ recommendations into 




To increase policy effectiveness, it may be 
practical to reconsider the ‘civil society vs. 
government’ approach which is especially 
visible in the case of multistakeholder bodies 
established in the framework of EU trade 
agreements. The EU may allow not only for 
stakeholder-to-stakeholder meetings but 
also for dialogues where both independent 
and government, or quasi-government, 
stakeholders are present. In practice, non-
governmental players in the EU’s partner 
countries frequently cannot act as watchdogs 
due to their inability to exercise influence on their 
issues 3d, 4b
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governments and, sometimes, outright hostility 
on the part of their administrations. Therefore, 
engagement with government representatives 
may prove more productive. While it may also 
raise doubts about co-optation, professional 
mediation at the meetings and appropriate 
communication about them should alleviate at 
least some of these concerns.
5.g Promoting horizontal ties among 
stakeholders
issue 3f
This obligation is stipulated in the Treaty on EU 
but is not sufficiently implemented in practice. 
Networking among business and non-economic 
interests on trade issues is scarce. Lack of 
dialogue augments mutual mistrust and slows 
down elaboration of common positions, which 
makes the work of multistakeholder bodies 
less efficient and effective. Some resource-
efficient measures to stimulate horizontal 
dialogue could include organizing joint field 
trips to partner countries for business and 
non-economic stakeholders, more in-person 
consultations in the form of roundtables and 
adding informal networking opportunities to the 
official programmes of consultations. 
5.h Building mutual awareness 
Mutual awareness and informedness is key to 
make multistakeholder mechanisms effective 
and efficient, because it aids in building 
mutual understanding and developing tailor-
made solutions. It is particularly important in 
settings where asymmetry between the EU 
and third countries exists, to make sure that 
the opinions of smaller and weaker actors from 
partner states are heard. To some extent, this 
issue could be addressed by capacity-building 
measures such as dedicating more resources 
to field trips and EU-to-partner meetings. 
Better liaison between the EU’s and member 
states’ delegations in partner states, their 
headquarters and stakeholders would also be 
important. 
6. Recommendations for 
improving procedural aspects of 
multistakeholderism 
6.a Changing the principles of stakeholder 
support
In line with the idea of more inclusive debate 
where the stakeholders are valued for the 
content (added value) of their contribution 
rather than their organizational form or the 
number of members they claim to represent, 
the EU should change the ways it supports 
non-governmental players in order to enable a 
broader range of organizations to take part in 
consultations. Moreover, to enable sustained 
and committed stakeholder involvement, the 
EU should extend the number of operational 
and long-term grants in contrast to its currently 
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6.b	Changing	incentives	for	stakeholders
Currently,  stakeholders take part in 
consultations on a purely voluntary basis, and 
there is a real risk of what one practitioner 
dubbed ‘DAG fatigue.’ Providing material 
incentives, such as reimbursement of costs 
incurred during participation, possibly per 
diems and micro-grants for analytical work 
or surveys of their organizations’ members, 
would be helpful in attracting a more diverse 
and engaged pool of stakeholders to bodies 
which require sustained commitment, such as 
Domestic Advisory Groups. This should apply 
to EU and partner countries’ stakeholders alike. 
6.c	Enhancing	publicity	and	providing	
‘one stop shop’ information 
Multi-stakeholder mechanisms need a massive 
publicity strategy offering a voice not only 
to the organizers (the EU) but also to the 
participants themselves. Press conferences, 
interviews on the margins of meetings and 
more engagement with content produced by 
stakeholders are all useful strategies. In parallel 
with stepping up publicity efforts, the EU should 
also ensure that the information about existing 
multistakeholder arrangements is clear, simple 
and easily accessible. Currently, information 
about various consultation mechanisms 
is scattered among multiple websites, is 
not always complete and up-to-date. What 
is needed is a ‘one stop shop’ information 
service, where stakeholders can easily access 
various participation opportunities, identify the 
specific stage a decision is in at the moment, 
responsible officers and their contact persons, 
apply for participation in the meetings, suggest 
own initiatives etc. Ideally, this would entail 
collaboration between all the different EU 
institutions engaged in trade policy-making as 
well as partner countries. 
6.d	Engaging	stakeholders	proactively	
Taking into account the complexity of the EU’s 
multistakeholder mechanisms, fragmented 
information on various participation 
opportunities and stakeholders’ limited 
resources, it is essential to engage stakeholders 
in a proactive manner. This means identifying 
stakeholders which might potentially be 
interested to contribute to a consultation 
process and addressing them in an appropriate 
way: using diverse forms of communication 
and providing them with easily understandable 
information about the topic. While this need 
is recognized in the EU’s Better Regulation 
Toolbox, in practice, the EU’s current model 
favours well-resourced and well-connected 
organizations, since others may never learn 
about participation opportunities. In order to 
implement this recommendation, stakeholder 
mapping / drawing of an expert register is 
necessary. 
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6.e	Engaging	stakeholders	more	efficiently	
Good management allows to maximise the 
results of meetings. While complete list of 
recommendations lies well beyond the scope 
of this paper, below are some points: 
• “Different types of meetings to meet 
different needs”21: current mechanisms 
attempt to cover a wide range of specific 
topics within a limited timespan and with 
a very broad and diverse stakeholder 
membership. In addition to plenary-style 
sessions where a broad range of questions 
is addressed it would be useful to organize 
meetings in smaller subgroups, parallel 
sessions etc. in order to have a more 
productive debate and clearer output.
• Producing analytical background papers 
in order to explain complex concepts and 
enable the meetings to focus on more 
specific topics, and discussion papers 
which offer new or provocative ideas. Such 
papers can be produced by members of 
stakeholder bodies or outsourced. 
• Having qualified moderators / mediators 
which dedicate time to engage with each 
participant individually before meeting the 
group, use advanced discussion techniques, 
help the group to reach consensus and 
formulate specific recommendations. 
• Engaging in support roles dedicated 
experts who can help with, for instance, 
drafting meeting documents, incorporating 
stakeholders’ suggestions and ensuring the 
wording of the final text fits EU legal acts. 
• Providing secretarial support to partner 
countries’ multistakeholder bodies. 
• Producing realistic working plans as well 
as interim / final reports. 
• Ensuring better continuity between meetings, 
inter alia by engaging stakeholders in their 
preparation in advance.3  
• Increasing use of e-consultation platforms 
as a complement, not replacement, for in-
person contacts. Advanced platforms can 
help with maintaining continuity between 
meetings, multilingual solutions, citizen 
engagement and more. 
6.f Strengthening engagement with 
stakeholders	on	the	national	level	
Without prejudice to member states’ 
competence, the EU should be more ambitious 
in strengthening engagement with stakeholders 
on the national level in national languages. 
These can take the form of increasing the 
number of existing Citizens’ Dialogues, 
empowering members of the European 
Parliament and European Economic and Social 
Committee to engage with the national publics, 
subcontracting organization of discussions to 
national-level stakeholders, etc. In addition, it 
is crucial to provide translation of events and 
documents that are related to consultations 
with stakeholders into the languages of the EU 
and, especially, its partner states. 
issues 3d, 4b
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Conclusions 
The European Commission can be commended 
for the recent initiatives to improve openness 
of its trade policy-making, create a dedicated 
Group of Experts on EU Trade Agreements, 
discuss the operation of civil society 
mechanisms under the Trade and Sustainable 
Development chapters and provide financial 
support to these mechanisms. However, these 
measures are not yet sufficient, and a broader 
overhaul of the Commission’s consultation 
practices is needed. The EU should adopt a 
holistic approach, identifying and filling the 
gaps in the overall consultation system. Its 
current system for engaging stakeholders is 
disjointed, meaning that there is a multitude 
of sometimes overlapping mechanisms 
which nevertheless do not ensure continuity 
and similar possibilities of contribution to 
policies at all stages of decision-making, to all 
stakeholders, on all topics in all trade deals. 
Quality and legitimacy of EU decision-making 
would be improved by ensuring continuity 
between different policy-making stages as 
well as more equal possibilities of engagement 
for diverse stakeholders. It is important to 
adhere to a broad and inclusive definition of 
multistakeholderism when developing formal 
consultation mechanisms. In addition, the EU 
faces difficulties of a more technical nature 
such as ensuring balanced representation of 
the views of all stakeholders, accountability 
and enabling political, institutional and legal 
environment. Horizontal dialogue among 
stakeholders is not supported to a sufficient 
degree, which hampers emergence of 
common positions. When recommendations 
are developed, they are not always heard by 
policy-makers, and there is no clarity about how, 
when and why they are adopted or rejected. 
Ensuring broad and efficient consultation with 
diverse stakeholders, mutual accountability 
and advanced communication with both 
stakeholders and broader public are some of 
the proposed measures which can improve 
quality and legitimacy of EU trade policies. 
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